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Abstract: This paper studies the issue of designing an optimal organizational form:
design for sub-units’ task allocation, decision-making structure, and incentive schemes
for organizational members. Depending on the way tasks are allocated between
the sub-units, and whether decision-making is centralized or not, organizations face
a trade-off between coordination and information. Task allocation by production
processes calls for coordination more strongly than the allocation by final products.
Centralized decision-making serves for better coordination, whereas decentralization
serves for better information. The coordinational benefit under centralization gets
bigger as the organization’s common uncertainty increases, and this benefit is mag-
nified when the sub-units are functionally divided by production processes. The
informational benefit under decentralization gets bigger as the organization’s local
uncertainty increases, and this benefit is magnified when the sub-units are designed
autonomous. Thus, complementarily designed organizations tend to have centralized
decision-making structures and fixed salary scheme, whereas less complementarily
designed organizations tend to have decentralized decision-making and ‘pay for per-
formance’ incentive contract.
1 Introduction
In designing an organization, a designer has to consider several basic internal struc-
tures of the organization, including what kind of and how much interaction be im-
plemented among its sub-units, how much of decision-making power be delegated to
them, and what kind of incentive schemes be provided for its members. These or-
ganizational design variables, say task allocation among sub-units, decision-making
structure, and incentive scheme, usually differ across organizations, and often appear
in specific combinations. For example, armies and government bureaucracies rely
more on centralized control, and they design their subdivisions more or less com-
plementary (that is, mutually supportive). Consider the relationship between the
infantry unit and the artillery unit in an army and the relationship between the state
department and the justice department in a government. The members in those
organizations usually receive a fixed salary. On the other hand, investment banks
and general hospitals rely more on decentralized delegation, and they design their
subdivisions rather self-contained. In investment banks, the relationship is rather
autonomous between foreign currency dealers and bond traders. Also autonomous
is the relationship between the ENT department and the psychiatric department in
a general hospital. In those organizations, several incentive schemes are often used
other than a fixed salary. In most investment banks, for example, fund managers are
usually rewarded according to the ’pay for performance’ scheme.
Dependence of an organization’s internal structures on its external environment
has been widely reported by contingency theorists in management. The contingency
theory postulates that an organization’s internal structures and its members’ behav-
ioral patterns are to a great extent affected by its external conditions. Woodward
(1958) reports that successful organizations in different industries are characterized by
different internal structures. After analyzing the history of several pioneering firms,
Chandler (1962) also concludes that organizational structures follow, and are guided
by strategic decisions, which, in turn, must respond to environmental changes.
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According to classical economic theories, economic agents’ activities are most
efficiently coordinated through the market mechanism. However, various market im-
perfections give rise to organizational coordination as an alternative. Among those
imperfections, we especially emphasize on the fact that organizations are operat-
ing in uncertain environments and organizational members have bounded rationality.
The organizational members are hierarchically arranged, differing in their decision-
making authority and accessibility to various sources of information. Thus, two basic
elements must be considered for better organizational performance. One is ‘efficient
information transmission’, referring to how to convey each member’s information to
others, and the other is ‘effective incentive provision’, referring to how to align mem-
bers’ diverse interests with the organization’s objectives. The internal structures of
an organization ought to be chosen to maximize information flow and to minimize
incentive distortion.
In this paper, we are interested in studying how an organization’s external envi-
ronments shape its internal structures. Thus, we ask why some organizations have
more centralized decision-making structures than others, why some organizations ask
their subordinates to specialize in a certain function (process), whereas others ask
them to produce a certain final product, and why some organizational members are
paid for their performance while others are paid a fixed salary. Especially, we are
interested in seeing relationships among these organizational design variables.
We consider an organization which produces two final goods. Each good, to be
produced, needs to go through two production lines. The organization is composed
of a single top manager and two functionally interrelated subordinates. The top
manager designs the organizational internal rules and structures, and monitors the
subordinates’ effort levels if necessary. He does not participate in production itself,
though. The subordinates actively participate in production by providing efforts,
guided by the organizational rules and incentives.
It is natural to assume that the top manager can determine the degree of inter-
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action between the sub-units by choosing the way to allocate the subordinates. The
top manager, by allocating the sub-units along the production lines (U-form orga-
nization), magnifies the degree of interaction. By allocating the sub-units along the
final products (M-form organization), he reduces the degree of mutual dependence.
In our model, the degree of interaction between the subordinates is captured through
the extent that one subordinate’s effort level helps the other’s performance.
From a different perspective, the organization, by allocating its sub-units along
the processes, makes each sub-unit specialize in a certain function and can exploit
returns to scale, presumably arising from division of labor. But, by allocating its
sub-units along the final products, it makes each sub-unit’s task overlap with others
and incurs waste of resources at the benefit of increased autonomy and the resulting
flexibility.
There are various kinds of uncertainties the organization faces, common uncer-
tainty, two line-specific uncertainties, and two good-specific uncertainties. The com-
mon uncertainty influences the entire organization, whereas each line-specific uncer-
tainty only affects that particular production line and each good-specific uncertainty
only affects that particular good. Due to the hierarchical arrangement, the top man-
ager has privileged access to the common uncertainty, and the subordinates have
privileged access to their own line-specific uncertainty when they are allocated along
the production lines and to their own good-specific uncertainty when they are allo-
cated along the goods.
To reduce the uncertainty the organization faces, information needs to be shared
among the organizational members. In general, there are two kinds of information
flows within the organization. One is top-down information flow and the other is
bottom-up flow. In this paper, we only consider the first one. Due to the pyramid
shape of the organization, the top-down information flow does not face traffic jam-
ming, whereas the opposite flows face capacity constraints. To simplify, we assume
that there is no jamming at all in the top-down information flow while there is extreme
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jamming in the opposite information flow.
After receiving a signal about the common uncertainty, the top manager conveys
his information to the local subordinates (top-down information flow). The top man-
ager can use either instruction or suggestion for communication, depending on the
degree of hierarchical control he would like to impose. Under the instruction mode,
the subordinates must fulfill the instruction without having flexibility to revise it.
We call this mode centralization. Under the suggestion mode, the subordinates can
revise the suggestion by incorporating their own local information which is either line-
specific or good-specific depending on the organizational form . We call this mode
decentralization.
There are trade-offs between centralized control and decentralized delegation.
Centralization has coordinational advantage, blocking the subordinates’ incentive dis-
tortion, whereas decentralization has informational advantage, utilizing the local in-
formation. From a different perspective, centralization incurs an information cost,
while decentralization incurs an agency cost. The agency cost of decentralization
depends on the incentive contracts for the local managers.
The coordinational advantage of centralization is large when the common tur-
bulence is big and when the sub-units are designed along the production processes.
To ensure that the sub-units follow the top manager’s instruction, the top manager
must monitor each unit’s activity level. Thus, input monitoring and a fixed salary
scheme are usually observed under centralization. As the size of common uncer-
tainty increases, the organization tends to rely more on centralized control, design
its sub-units along the production processes, and provide a fixed salary for its local
managers.
The informational advantage of decentralization, is large when the local turbu-
lence is big, whether line-specific or good-specific. Under delegation, observing each
unit’s activity level directly is meaningless, and incentive for each local manager must
be given by an incentive contract contingent on his performance. Thus, output mon-
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itoring and incentive payment scheme are often observed under decentralization. In
this paper, we only consider two kinds of incentive contracts which are two dominant
contractual features in the real world: individual incentive contracts and group in-
centive contracts. Under the individual incentive contract, each subordinate’s payoff
depends only on his performance, whereas it depends on the team performance under
the group incentive contract.
Decentralization with group incentive scheme hits a balance between the combi-
nation (centralization, fixed salary) and the combination (decentralization, individual
incentive). In terms of agency cost, by making each sub-unit’s salary contingent on
their combined performance, it reduces the agency cost of the (decentralization, in-
dividual incentive) combination at the cost of creating a new, free-rider problem. In
terms of information, by delegating the authority to finalize decisions, it utilizes the
local information which is not available under the former combination.
We expect to derive that the organization tends to use centralized control if the
common uncertainty is big and the local uncertainty is small, if the degree of interac-
tion among the subordinates is high, and if the input monitoring cost is low. Moreover,
the centralized organization provides fixed salary schemes for the subordinates and
always organizes them according to the production line (i.e., U-form centralization).
On the other hand, the organization tends to decentralize and use individual incentive
contracts if the market uncertainty is small and the local uncertainty is big, and if
the degree of interaction is low, whereas it tends to decentralize and use group incen-
tives if both the market and local uncertainties are big. Decentralized delegation may
come along with an M-form organizational mode (i.e., organizing the subordinates
according to the good) if the good-specific uncertainty is sufficiently big compared
with the line-specific uncertainty. These expected results look quite consistent with
many empirical findings in the organizational literature.
There are several papers that study the organization’s internal design issues. How-
ever, most of them address only one issue out of these inter-related design issues. For
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decision-making structure, Bolton and Farrel (1990) find, in the context of an en-
try game into a natural monopoly, that centralization is preferred to speed up the
entrance decision, whereas decentralization is preferred to make use of potential en-
trants’ private information. In comparing the relative efficiencies of centralized control
and decentralization, Aoki (1986) argues that decentralized firms have an advantage
in identifying and quickly responding to emergent events, while centralized firms have
advantage in coordinating the operating units through the use of common technology.
More recently, Aghion and Tirole (1997) show that delegating (formal) authority to
the agent can facilitate the agent’s participation in the organization and enhance the
agent’s incentive to acquire information about the project alternatives. At the same
time, it can involve a costly loss of control since the agent may choose the project
that is not best for the principal.
Regarding task allocation for organizational sub-units, Maskin, Qian, and Xu
(1997) show that if the regional shocks are more closely correlated than the industrial
shocks, an M-form organization is better than a U-form organization, and vice versa.
It is because, when the regional shocks are more closely correlated than the indus-
trial shocks, designing relative incentive contracts for regional operating managers is
easier than designing relative contracts for industry-wise operating managers. Thus,
an M-form organization enables the top management to design relative incentive con-
tracts for the local managers that are less costly in the sense of Blackwell’s efficiency.
Aghion and Tirole (1995) show that a growing firm eventually switches from a U-
form organizational mode to an M-form. As a firm grows, the headquarter’s overload
increases. To reduce the headquarter’s overload, it is a good idea to create several
profit centers.
However, none of the above papers study the interrelationship between the orga-
nization’s decision-making structure and other internal design issues. One exception
is Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994). Using a multi-task principal-agent model, they
study the complementarities of various incentive instruments such as asset ownership,
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decision-making structure, and incentive contract. They show that, as the difficulty
of evaluating performance and the importance of non-selling activities increase, firms
tend to choose direct selling rather than using independent sales representatives. And
that the in-house sales agents tend to face more restrictions for outside activities and
to receive a fixed salary. However, they do not analyze the organizational design for
sub-units’ task allocation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a sim-
ple organizational model. In section 3, we investigate a hypothetical case in which
the top manager commands perfect information on both the common shock and the
local shocks. In sections 4 and 5, we derive the organization’s expected profits un-
der centralization and decentralization, respectively, assuming that the top manager
has information only on the common shock. In section 6, by comparing the organiza-
tion’s expected profits under centralization and decentralization, we identify the main
factors that determine the organization’s optimal decision-making structure and its
design for sub-units’ task allocation. In section 7, we apply our results to explaining
several stylized phenomena in organizations. Concluding remarks follow in section 8.
All the proofs of the Lemmas and Propositions are deferred to the Appendix.
2 The Model
We view an organization as a collection of decision-makers with bounded rationality.
Iin order for an organization to function effectively, information that each organiza-
tional member has must be fully utilized, and each organizational member’s interest
must be aligned to the organization’s objectives. Accordingly, the organization’s in-
ternal structures must be designed to minimize both information loss and incentive
distortion.
For analytical simplicity, we consider an organization which produces two different
goods, good A and good B. Each good, to be produced, needs to go through two
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production lines, line 1 and line 2. One may think of line 1 as a production process
which translates natural resources into intermediate goods, whereas line 2 as another
production process which transforms those intermediate goods into final ones. Thus,
there are four tasks that the organization must accomplish to produce both goods.
They are denoted as A1, A2, B1, and B2, where A1 represents the task associated
with the first production line for good A, and so on.
In performing those tasks, the organization faces with several kinds of uncertain-
ties. We denote θm as a market shock which commonly affects the performances of
all the tasks such as the government’s economic policies. We denote θA (or θB) as a
good A (or good B) specific shock which only affects the performances of the tasks
associated with producing good A (or good B), i.e., A1 and A2 (or B1 and B2). An
example of this shock is change in consumers’ taste for a good. Denote θ1 (or θ2)
as a line 1 (or line 2) specific shock which only affects the performances of the tasks
associated with line 1 (or line 2), i.e., A1 and B1 (or A2 and B2). An example of
this shock is change in technology in a production line. All shocks are assumed to
be mutually independent with zero means and variances equal to σ2m, σ
2
A, σ
2
B, σ
2
1, σ
2
2,
respectively.
Organizations differ in assigning various tasks to their members. Some organiza-
tions emphasize more on each member’s expertise in a certain function. The final
products are produced by combining those specialized functions. An extreme organi-
zational form toward this direction is a U-form organization according to Chandler’s
(1962) definition. Other organizations instead emphasize more on each member’s
general knowledge that helps him perform various functions and produce a certain
product. An extreme organizational form toward this direction is an M-form organi-
zation according to Chandler’s definition.
To model these features, we assume that the organization comprises of a top
manager and two sub-units. The top manager is assumed risk-neutral. The two sub-
units are run by two local managers who are also risk-neutral and have a reservation
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utility level of U . Each local manager is supposed to perform two tasks. Thus, there
are two reasonable ways the top manager assigns the above four tasks to two local
managers. First, the sub-units are organized according to the production line, which
resembles a U-form organization. In this case, the local manager 1 performs A1 and
B1, while local manager 2 performs A2 and B2. Second, the sub-units are organized
according to the good, which resembles an M-form organization. In this case, local
manager A performs A1 and A2, while local manager B performs B1 and B2.1 (Note
that, when the sub-units are organized according to the production line, we denote
the local managers as manager 1 and manager 2, whereas we denote them as manager
A and manager B when they are organized according to the final product.)
To accomplish the assigned tasks, each manager i, i = 1, 2, or A,B, provides an
effort, ai, which costs him c(ai) = c0ai. Given manager j’s effort level, aj, j = i,
manager i’s effort ai contributes to the organization a unit value (average value per
unit effort) vi which is denoted as
vi = µ− 1
2
ai + δaj + ui, i = j i, j = 1, 2 or A,B, (1)
where δ denotes the degree of interaction between the two sub-units and ui denotes
the uncertain factors involved.
The above equation indicates that the unit value of a local manager’s effort de-
creases as his own effort level increases, reflecting diminishing marginal productivity
of effort. In the above equation δ takes two values, δl and δg, depending on the orga-
nizational form, where δl denotes the external effect between the two sub-units when
they are organized according to the production line, and δg denotes the external effect
when they are organized according to the good. We assume that δg ≤ δl, implying the
external effect is greater when they are organized according to production lines. For
instance, in a university, the economics department and the physics department are
1One more possible task assignment is that one local manager performs A1 and B2, whereas the
other local manager performs A2 and B1. However, since it is unreasonable in terms of specialization,
we do not consider this case.
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rather independent, whereas, in an army, the infantry unit and the artillery unit are
mutually supportive in the sense that a good effort from the artillery unit improves
the infantry unit’s performance. Also, it is reasonable to assume that the maximum
cross effect is smaller than the own effect, i.e., 0 < δg ≤ δl < 12 .
When the organization designs the sub-units according to the production line, the
total amount of uncertainty involved with manager i’s effort becomes
ui = θm + θi + θA + θB, i = 1, 2. (2)
It is because manager i in charge of production line i faces the market uncertainty
and its own production line uncertainty, and because the manager performs two tasks
Ai and Bi.
On the other hand, when the organization designs its sub-units according to the
good, the total amount of uncertainty involved with manager i’s effort becomes
ui = θm + θi + θ1 + θ2, i = A,B, (3)
We assume that neither manager’s unit value vi nor his effort level ai is directly
observable to the top manager. However, the top manager can observe (ai, aj), i, j =
1, 2 or A,B, by investing M into monitoring both managers’ effort levels directly. On
the other hand, there is a performance measure for unit i such as unit i’s accounting
sales value which is observable to the top manager without cost. We assume that
unit i’s accounting sales value xi comprises of its true contribution, viai and a white
noise ηi,
xi = viai + ηi, E(ηi) = 0, i = 1, 2 or A,B. (4)
The organization members have different access to different information sources.
Due to hierarchical structure, it is quite natural to assume that the top manager
has privileged access to the information about the market turbulence, while the local
managers have privileged access to the information on their own local turbulence.
Furthermore, since the area in which each local manager specializes varies with the
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organizational form, the local managers have access to different local information
depending on how they are organized. For instance, if a local manager is designed
to specialize in a certain production line, he has more information about the shock
that is specific to that line, and if he is designed to specialize in a certain good, he
has more information about the shock that is specific to that good. For simplicity,
we assume that the top manager only observes the market shock, θm, whereas local
manager i only observes his own specific local shock, θi.
2 In other words, managers
1 and 2 observe θ1 and θ2, respectively, when the sub-units are organized according
to the production line, whereas managers A and B observe θA and θB, respectively,
when the sub-units are organized according to the good.
After observing the true value of the market shock θm, the top manager chooses
each unit’s effort level to maximize the whole organization’s profit based on θm. It
is because the top manager’s maximizing the organization’s joint profit is equivalent
to maximizing his own profit after giving each local manager the reservation level of
utility. Let ai be the optimal effort level for unit i as determined by the top manager,
i = 1, 2 or A,B. Then, the top manager has to decide how to convey ai to sub-unit
i. There are two ways for the top manager to communicate his decision ai with the
sub-units. One is ‘instruction’ and the other is ‘suggestion’, differing in the degree
of delegation. If ai is given as instruction, the sub-units have no other option but to
carry out ai as instructed. We call this a centralized decision-making structure since
the decision-making power lies with the top management. In this case, in order to
ensure each unit to make the instructed level of effort, the top manager must invest
M to observe ai, and design a forcing contract for each local manager i.
On the other hand, if ai is given as suggestion, manager i can revise his effort
level based on his own local information θi. We call this a decentralized decision-
2So far as the top manager has more precise information on the market shock and less precise
information on the local shocks than the local managers, the main implications in this paper still
hold qualitatively.
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making structure since the ultimate decision right is delegated to each local manager.
Since the final effort level is determined by each local unit under decentralization,
the top manager will have to design an incentive contract based on (xi, xj) for each
local manager rather than a forcing contract. Whether the sub-units will maximize
the organization’s profit or not in this case depends on how the local managers’
compensation contracts are designed.
In sum, the top manager jointly determines the decision-making structure, the
organizational form, and incentive contract for each local manager. When the or-
ganization is centralized, it cannot use the local managers’ useful local information,
incurring information loss. On the other hand, when the organization is decentral-
ized, it cannot coordinate the local managers efficiently, incurring an agency cost.
The amount of the agency cost depends on the organizational form as well as the
local managers’ incentive contracts. Thus, information and coordination are two ba-
sic elements to be considered in designing an optimal organization. To analyze this
design problem, we adopt a backward induction. Given the organization’s internal
design (decision-making structure, organizational form, and incentive contracts for lo-
cal managers), the top manager computes the organization’s expected profit. Then,
choose an optimal internal design to maximize the profit among all possible combi-
nations of the decision-making structure, the organizational form, and the incentive
contracts for local managers.
3 Full Information and Full Coordination
To mainly focus on the relative efficiencies of the two decision-making structures
mentioned above, we start with a counterfactual benchmark case in which the top
manager commands perfect information on all shocks and he fully coordinates the
two sub-units (i.e., the top manager observes ai without cost). In this hypothetical
case, the optimal decision-making structure must be a centralized one since the top
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manager knows everything.
First, suppose that the sub-units are organized according to the production line.
As mentioned earlier, since the top manager’s maximizing his own profit with guaran-
teeing the local managers the reservation level of utility, U , is technically equivalent
to his maximizing the organization’s joint profit, the top manager’s decision for both
units’ effort levels (ah1 , a
h
2) satisfies
(ah1 , a
h
2) = argmaxa1,a2(v1a1 + v2a2)− c0(a1 + a2). (5)
From the first-order conditions, we have
ah1 = (R1 + 2δlR2)/(1− 4δ2l ),
ah2 = (R2 + 2δlR1)/(1− 4δ2l ),
(6)
where Ri = (µ−c0)+θm+θi+θA+θB, i = 1, 2. We need δ < 1/2 to satisfy the second-
order condition. This condition states that, in determining unit i’s contribution to
the organization, its own effort plays a bigger role than the other unit’s effort.
This hypothetical situation will yield the maximum expected profit for the whole
organization. Let vh1 and v
h
2 be the unit values corresponding to a
h
1 and a
h
2 , that is,
vhi = µ− ahi /2 + δlahj + θm + θi + θA + θB, i = j, i, j = 1, 2. Thus, when the sub-units
are organized according to the production line, the optimized expected profit under
the hypothetical situation is
πhl = ER[(v
h
1 − c0)ah1 + (vh2 − c0)ah2 ]
= ER[R1(R1 + 2δlR2) +R2(R2 + 2δlR1)]/2(1− 4δ2l ),
(7)
where ER denotes that the expectation is taken with respect toR ≡ (θm, θ1, θ2, θA, θB).
Using (1) and (2), we derive
πhl =
1
1− 2δl [(µ− c0)
2 + σ2m + σ
2
A + σ
2
B ] +
1
2(1− 4δ2l )
(σ21 + σ
2
2). (8)
Equation (8) shows that the organization’s profit under the hypothetical situation
increases with the size of any uncertainty. This is because, when the organization
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obtains full information about all kinds of uncertainties, the organization’s expected
profit increases with the amount of information on all kinds of uncertainties, and the
amount of information on any uncertainty is measured by the corresponding variance
because the unit value function is linear.
Likewise, one can easily derive that the optimized expected profit under the hy-
pothetical situation when the sub-units are organized according to the good is
πhg =
1
1− 2δg [(µ− c0)
2 + σ2m + σ
2
1 + σ
2
2] +
1
2(1− 4δ2g)
(σ2A + σ
2
B). (9)
4 Centralization
We now turn to a realistic case in which the top manager has information only
on the market shock. Suppose that the organization chooses centralization as its
decision-making structure and the sub-units are organized according to the production
line. Then, since the top manager’s maximizing his own profit with guaranteeing the
local managers the reservation level of utility, U , is equivalent to his maximizing the
organization’s joint profit, the top manager chooses the optimal effort levels (ac1, a
c
2)
for both local units to maximize the expected joint profit based on his information
θm. That is,
(ac1, a
c
2) = argmaxa1,a2 ER[(v1 − c0)a1 + (v2 − c0)a2|θm], (10)
where ER[·|θm] denotes that the expectation is taken with respect to R given θm
(similarly defined, hereafter). By solving the first-order conditions, we have
ac1 = (γ1 + 2δlγ2)/(1− 4δ2l )
ac2 = (γ2 + 2δlγ1)/(1− 4δ2l ),
(11)
where
γi = ER(Ri|θm) = µ− c0 + θm, i = 1, 2. (12)
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Under centralization, the top manager must invest M to ensure that both sub-
units carry out aci as instructed by the top manager, and design forcing contracts for
both local managers. Thus, by plugging (11) into (10) and taking expectation with
respect to θm, we obtain the optimized expected profit under centralization when the
sub-units are organized according to the production line as
πcl =
1
1− 2δl [(µ− c0)
2 + σ2m]−M. (13)
By subtracting (13) from (8), we have the cost of centralization compared with
the hypothetical case when the sub-units are organized according to the production
line as
πhl − πcl =
1
1− 2δl (σ
2
A + σ
2
B) +
1
2(1− 4δ2l )
(σ21 + σ
2
2) +M. (14)
The first two terms on the right-hand side of the above equation represent the effi-
ciency loss of the centralized decision-making structure compared with the hypothet-
ical case arising from the organization’s inability to utilize information on the local
shocks. Under the hypothetical case, every piece of information on (θ1, θ2, θA, θB) is
used cooperatively. Especially, when the sub-units are organized according to the
production line, the good-specific information, (θA, θB), is used commonly by both
line managers, whereas the line-specific information, (θ1, θ2), is used independently.
However, under centralization, no local information is used at all. We term these as
an information cost of U-form centralization. Obviously, the third term represents
the monitoring cost that is necessary for implementing the forcing contracts for both
local managers under centralization.
Likewise, one can easily derive the optimized expected profit under centralization
when the sub-units are organized according to the good as
πcg =
1
1− 2δg [(µ− c0)
2 + σ2m]−M, (15)
and the cost of centralization compared with the hypothetical case in this case as
πhg − πcg =
1
1− 2δg (σ
2
1 + σ
2
2) +
1
2(1− 4δ2g)
(σ2A + σ
2
B) +M. (16)
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Since δg ≤ δl, by comparing (13) and (15), we have
πcg ≤ πcl , (17)
implying that the sub-units must always be organized according to the production
line under centralization. This is because only the market information is used under
centralization regardless of the organizational form, and the organization will enjoy
the maximum interaction effect when the sub-units are organized according to the
production line because δg ≤ δl.
This result under centralization is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Under centralization, to ensure that both sub-units choose ac1 and a
c
2
as instructed, the top manager designs forcing contracts for both local managers, and
the sub-units are always organized according to the production line (U-form central-
ization).
5 Decentralization
Suppose that the organization chooses a decentralized decision-making structure. Un-
der decentralization, the top manager’s decision on the optimal effort levels of both
local managers based on his information, θm, is the same as (a
c
1, a
c
2) determined in
equation (11) if the sub-units are organized according to the production line, and
(acA, a
c
B) which is similar to (a
c
1, a
c
2) if the sub-units are organized according to the
good. However, he conveys (aci , a
c
j), i = j, i, j = 1, 2 or A,B, to the sub-units as
suggestion. Thus, after receiving aci , each manager i revises it based on his local
information θi, i = 1, 2 or A,B.
Since, given the top manager’s decision rule, manager i can always recover the
top manager’s information θm from his suggestion a
c
i , the information available to
manager i ultimately expands to (θm, θi). However, this augmented information may
not be used in an optimal way from the whole organization’s perspective. In fact,
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local manager i determines his final effort level, say adi , by maximizing his own profit
which is determined by his incentive contract.
Generally, the top manager has a limited ability in processing all the bottom-up
information flows mainly due to his limited time and/or the headquarter’s overload.
Thus, to make our analysis simple, we assume that, although the local managers
obtain private information on their own local shocks before choosing their effort levels,
they cannot report their own information to the top manager. As a result, the top
manager cannot design truth-telling contracts for both local managers.3
In this paper, we only consider two kinds of incentive contracts: an individual
incentive contract, i.e., si = si(xi), and a group incentive contract, i.e., si = si(xi +
xj), i = j, i, j = 1, 2, or A,B. These incentive contracts well cover the typical work
practices in most organizations.4 Although the organization’s use of incentive schemes
that are sensitive to individual performance measures has been considered as one of
traditional work practices, the team-based group incentives recently receive growing
attention in the literature as an alternative.5
Since the top manager and the local managers are assumed to be risk-neitral,
without loss of any generality, one can only consider linear contracts. Thus, we
denote the individual incentive contract for local manager i as
si(xi) = kixi,
6, ki ≤ 1, i = 1, 2, or A,B, (18)
3Even if the top manager can design truth-telling contracts for local managers, our main re-
sults will not change qualitatively as long as the full information outcome is not obtainable. For
some practical reasons why the top manager cannot design truth-telling contracts, see Laffont and
Martimort (1997).
4For empirical evidence for the use of team-based group incentives, see Boning, Ichniowski, and
Shaw (1997), and Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1998).
5See Kandel and Lazear (1992), Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994), Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1994), and Milgrom and Roberts (1995).
6We do not need to consider a lump-sum transfer between the top manager and each local
manager because the top manager’s maximizing the joint profit is equivalent to maximizing his own
profit with guaranteeing the local managers the reservation level of utility.
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and the group incentive contract as
si(xi+ xj) = hi(xi+xj), 0 ≤ hi ≤ 1, 0 ≤ hi+hj ≤ 1, i = j, i, j = 1, 2, or A,B, (19)
where ki and hi in the above two equations denote manager i’s incentive powers that
are attached to his individual performance and the group performance, respectively.
The reason we specify in the above equation that ki ≤ 1 and hi+hj ≤ 1 is because,
if ki > 1 or hi + hj > 1, then the top manager will actually try to minimize each
sub-unit’s accounting sales value (top manager’s sabotaging activity). For example, if
ki > 1 in the individual incentive contract, the top manager’s payoff will be negatively
tied to the manager i’s accounting sales value. Thus, the top manager will face an
incentive to exercise his sabotaging activity to reduce local manager i’s performance
xi. Likewise, if hi + hj > 1 in the group incentive contract, the top manager will
have an incentive to exercise his sabotaging activity to reduce the joint performance
xi + xj .
5.1 Decentralization with Individual Incentives
Suppose that the top manager designs individual incentive contracts, si(xi) = kixi
for both managers. We also start with the case in which the sub-units are organized
according to the production line.
Since unit j’s local information is not revealed to unit i, unit i has to form an
expectation on unit j’s effort level based on its information Ii ≡ {θm, θi}, i = 1, 2.
Here, unit j’s optimal effort level should be consistent with unit i’s expectation, and
vice versa. To satisfy this requirement, we adopt a Bayesian Nash solution concept.
Thus, the top manager’s optimization program in this case is:
Max Eθm{ER[(v1 − c0)a1 + (v2 − c0)a2|θm]}
k1, k2 s.t.
(i) a1 ∈ argmax EY [k1x1 − c0a1|I1]
(ii) a2 ∈ argmax EY [k2x2 − c0a2|I2],
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where Y ≡ {θm, θ1, θ2, θA, θB, η1, η2, ηA, ηB, } denotes a set of all uncertainties in the
model, and Ii ≡ {θm, θi} is an information set available to manager i. The constraints
in the above program denote local managers’ incentive constraints.
Thus, given (k1, k2), each unit’s decision problem under decentralization is char-
acterized by
ad1(k1, k2) = argmaxa1EY [k1(v1a1 + η1)− c0a1|I1],
ad2(k1, k2) = argmaxa2EY [k2(v2a2 + η2)− c0a2|I2].
(20)
By solving (20) as detailed in the appendix, we derive
ad1(k1, k2) =
1
1−δl (µ+ θm) + θ1 − 11−δ2l (
c0
k1
+ δl
c0
k2
)
ad2(k1, k2) =
1
1−δl (µ+ θm) + θ2 − 11−δ2l (
c0
k2
+ δl
c0
k1
).
(21)
By plugging (21) into (1), we obtain the unit values for both local managers given
(k1, k2) as
vd1(k1, k2) =
1
2(1−δl)(µ+ θm) +
θ1
2
+ δlθ2 + θA + θB
+[
(1−2δ2l )c0
2(1−δ2
l
)k1
− δlc0
2(1−δ2
l
)k2
],
vd2(k2, k1) =
1
2(1−δl)(µ+ θm) +
θ2
2
+ δlθ1 + θA + θB
+[
(1−2δ2l )c0
2(1−δ2
l
)k2
− δlc0
2(1−δ2
l
)k1
].
(22)
Thus, as shown in the Appendix, given (k1, k2), the expected profit in this case is
πdlI(k1, k2) =
1
(1−δl)2 [(µ− c0)2 + σ2m] + 12(σ21 + σ22)−
(µ−c0)c0
(1−δl)2 (
1−k1
k1
+ 1−k2
k2
)
− (1−3δ2l )c20
2(1−δ2
l
)2
[(1−k1
k1
)2 + (1−k2
k2
)2] +
2δ3l c
2
0
(1−δ2
l
)2
(1−k1
k1
)(1−k2
k2
).
(23)
From (23), we directly obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 1: Let kdi be the optimal incentive power of the individual incentive con-
tract for local manager i, i = 1, 2, under decentralization. Then, kd1 = k
d
2 = 1, i.e.,
the organization must provide high-powered incentives for the local managers when it
implements individual incentive contracts.
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From (21), we have
∂adi (ki, kj)
∂ki
=
c0
(1− δ2l )k2i
> 0,
implying that as the local managers are provided with higher incentive, they increase
their effort levels. If the incentive power is set equal to one, the local managers
are induced to maximize their own profit which is different from maximizing the
organization’s joint profit due to the existence of the external effect. In fact, since
δl > 0, the effort level chosen by the self-interested local manager will be lower than
the effort level that would be chosen by the joint profit maximizing manager with
the same information (θm, θi). Thus, the top manager would like to provide higher
incentive to increase each sub-unit’s effort level, if possible. However, it is not possible
because, as discussed earlier, kdi cannot exceed one. Therefore, the optimal incentive
power given to each local manager, kdi , must be one, and there arises an efficiency
loss due to lack of coordination under decentralization with individual incentives.
By plugging kd1 = k
d
2 = 1 into (23), we eventually derive that the optimized
expected profit under decentralization with individual incentives when the sub-units
are organized according to the production line is
πdlI =
1
(1− δl)2 [(µ− c0)
2 + σ2m] +
1
2
(σ21 + σ
2
2). (24)
By subtracting (24) from (8), we have
πhl − πdlI = δ
2
l
(1−2δl)(1−δl)2 [(µ− c0)2 + σ2m] + 11−2δl (σ2A + σ2B)
+
4δ2
l
2(1−4δl)2 (σ
2
1 + σ
2
2).
(25)
As shown in (25), the cost of U-form decentralization with individual incentives com-
pared with the hypothetical case is composed of three parts. Note that each local
manager is maximizing his own profit rather than the organization’s joint profit under
decentralization with individual incentives. Thus, the first term on the right-hand side
of (25) represents the cost that arises from that information on the market shock, θm,
is used non-cooperatively under decentralization with individual incentives. We term
this as a cost of less coordination under decentralization with individual incentives,
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which increases with the size of the common shock. The second term represents the
cost arising from that information on the good-specific shocks, (θA, θB), is not used
under decentralization when the sub-units are organized according to the production
line, whereas the third term is the cost arising from that manager 1 only uses his own
production line information, θ1, by taking expectation on θ2 and vice versa.
Likewise, one can easily derive the optimized expected profit under decentraliza-
tion with individual incentives when the sub-units are organized according to the
good as
πdgI =
1
(1− δg)2 [(µ− c0)
2 + σ2m] +
1
2
(σ2A + σ
2
B). (26)
The cost of M-form decentralization with individual incentives compared with the
hypothetical case as
πhg − πdgI = δ
2
g
(1−2δg)(1−δg)2 [(µ− c0)2 + σ2m] + 11−2δg (σ21 + σ22)
+
4δ2g
2(1−4δg)2 (σ
2
A + σ
2
B).
(27)
5.2 Decentralization with Group Incentives
Now, suppose that the top manager designs group incentive contracts, si(xi + xj) =
hi(xi + xj), for both managers. Again, we start with the case in which the sub-units
are organized according to the production line. Thus, the top manager’s optimization
program in this case is:
Max Eθm{ER[(v1 − c0)a1 + (v2 − c0)a2|θm]}
h1, h2 s.t.
(i) a1 ∈ argmax EY [h1(x1 + x2)− c0a1|I1]
(ii) a2 ∈ argmax EY [h2(x1 + x2)− c0a2|I2].
Given (h1, h2), each unit’s decision problem under decentralization in this case is
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characterized by
ad1(h1, h2) = argmaxa1EY [h1(v1a1 + v2a2 + η1 + η2)− c0a1|I1],
ad2(h2, h1) = argmaxa2EY [h2(v1a1 + v2a2 + η1 + η2)− c0a2|I2].
(28)
Thus, we similarly derive
ad1(h1, h2) =
1
1−2δl (µ+ θm) + θ1 − 11−4δ2l (
c0
h1
+ 2δl
c0
h2
)
ad2(h2, h1) =
1
1−2δl (µ+ θm) + θ2 − 11−4δ2l (
c0
h2
+ 2δl
c0
h1
).
(29)
The expected profit given (h1, h2) in this case is
πdlG(h1, h2) =
1
1−2δl (µ
2 + σ2m) +
1
2
(σ21 + σ
2
2)− 21−2δlµc0
+
c20
2(1−4δ2
l
)
[2(1+2δl)
h1
− 1
h21
+ 2(1+2δl)
h2
− 1
h22
− 4δl
h1h2
]
(30)
From (30), we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 2: When the organization implements group incentive contracts for the local
managers under decentralization, the optimal incentive power on the joint sales value
must be hd1 = h
d
2 =
1
2
.
We now make the following assumption.
Assumption 1: µ > 2c0.
This assumption is needed to make hd1 = h
d
2 =
1
2
a meaningful solution. Otherwise,
ER(ad1(h1, h2)) < 0 and ER(a
d
2(h2, h1)) < 0, which implies that designing a group
incentive contracts will never be optimal.
By substituting hd1 = h
d
2 =
1
2
, into (30), we derive that the optimized expected
profit under decentralization with group incentives when the sub-units are organized
according to the production line is
πdlG =
1
1− 2δl [(µ− c0)
2 + σ2m]−
1
1− 2δl c
2
0 +
1
2
(σ21 + σ
2
2), (31)
and by subtracting (31) from (8), we have
πhl − πdlG =
1
1− 2δl c
2
0 +
1
1− 2δl (σ
2
A + σ
2
B) +
4δ2l
2(1− 4δl)2 (σ
2
1 + σ
2
2). (32)
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The cost of U-form decentralization with group incentives compared with the hypo-
thetical case is also composed of three parts. Note that each local manager with a
group incentive contract maximizes his profit that is positively tied to the organiza-
tion’s joint profit. Thus, unlike the case in which individual incentive contracts are
designed, there is no coordination problem. However, there arises a new free-rider
problem on each manager’s side because hd1 = h
d
2 =
1
2
< 1. The first term in the
right-hand side of (31) represents the cost arising from the free-rider problem. The
second and third terms are the same as previously explained. Note that the cost of a
free-rider problem is independent of the size of any uncertainty.
Likewise, one can easily derive the optimized expected profit under decentraliza-
tion with group incentives when the sub-units are organized according to the good
as
πdgG =
1
1− 2δg [(µ− c0)
2 + σ2m]−
1
1− 2δg c
2
0 +
1
2
(σ2A + σ
2
B). (33)
The cost of M-form decentralization with group incentives compared with the hypo-
thetical case is
πhg − πdgG =
1
1− 2δg c
2
0 +
1
1− 2δg (σ
2
1 + σ
2
2) +
4δ2g
2(1− 4δg)2 (σ
2
A + σ
2
B). (34)
By comparing (24) with (26) and (31) with (33), we directly obtain the following
proposition:
Proposition 2: Under decentralization (using either individual incentives or group
incentives), even if δg ≤ δl, the sub-units may be organized according to the good (i.e.,
M-form decentralization) if δl− δg is small and the size of good-specific uncertainties,
σ2A+σ
2
B, is sufficiently big compared with the size of line-specific uncertainties, σ
2
1+σ
2
2.
Otherwise, the sub-units will be organized according to the production line (i.e., U-
form decentralization).
As shown in Proposition 1, the sub-units will always be organized accoding to
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the production line under centralization (U-form centralization). However, under
decentralization, different kinds of local information will be used depending on the
organizational form. For example, line-specific information (θ1, θ2) will be used re-
gardless of incentive contracts when the sub-units are organized according to the
production line, whereas the good-specific information, (θA, θB), will be used when
they are organized according to the good. Thus, if the value of information associated
with the good-specific shocks, i.e., σ2A+σ
2
B, is sufficiently bigger than that associated
with the line-specific shocks, i.e., σ21 +σ
2
2 , then designing M-form decentralization (ei-
ther with individual incentives or group incentives) will improve on the organizational
efficiency compared with U-form decentralization.
Also, by comparing (24) with (31) and (26) with (33), we derive
πdlI − πdlG =
1
1− 2δl c
2
0 −
δ2l
(1− 2δl)(1− δl)2 [(µ− c0)
2 + σ2m], (35)
and
πdgI − πdgG =
1
1− 2δg c
2
0 −
δ2g
(1− 2δg)(1− δg)2 [(µ− c0)
2 + σ2m]. (36)
The first terms in the above two equations represent the cost of free-riding un-
der decentralization using group incentives. The second terms represent the cost of
less coordination under decentralization using individual incentives. From the above
equations, we obtain the following lemma:
Lemma 3: There always exists a unique δˆ ∈ (0, 1
2
) such that the group incentive
contract is preferred to the individual incentive contract under U-form (or M-form)
decentralization if and only if δl(or δg) ≥ δˆ.
Therefore, since δg ≤ δl, we can directly obtain the following proposition from
Lemma 3:
Proposition 3: The group incentive contract is more likely to be designed under
U-form decentralization than under M-form decentralization.
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Proposition 3 shows that group incentive contracts for local managers will be more
likely when the sub-units are organized according to the production line than when
they are organized according to the good. It is because if the group incentive contract
is more efficient than the individual incentive contract under M-form decentralization,
then it is always more efficient than the individual incentive contract under U-form
decentralization. On the other hand, individual incentive contracts for local managers
will be more likely when the sub-units are organized according to the good than when
they are organized according to the production line.
6 Centralization vs. Decentralization
There is a trade-off between the centralized and decentralized decision-making struc-
tures. The decentralized decision-making structure is subject to incentive distortion
either from less coordination when the individual incentive contracts are designed or
from free-riding when the group incentive contracts are designed. On the other hand,
the centralized decision-making structure is subject to information loss by not utiliz-
ing the local information. Thus, the answer to the question of which decision-making
structure must be adopted and which incentive contract must be designed for each
local manager, depends on the relative magnitude of the above three costs.
To simplify, let us assume that δg = δl = δ. (Toward the end of this section, we
will relax this assumption). Define
σ2local = max{σ21 + σ22, σ2A + σ2B}.
Then, the optimized expected profits under centralization, decentralization with indi-
vidual incentives, and decentralization with group incentives reduce to, respectively:
πc =
1
1− 2δ [(µ− c0)
2 + σ2m]−M, (37)
πdI ≡ max{πdlI , πdgI} =
1
(1− δ)2 [(µ− c0)
2 + σ2m] +
1
2
σ2local, (38)
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and
πdG ≡ max{πdlG, πdgG} =
1
1− 2δ [(µ− c0)
2 + σ2m]−
1
1− 2δ c
2
0 +
1
2
σ2local. (39)
By subtracting (38) from (37), we obtain the benefit from centralization over
decentralization using individual incentives as
P (σ2local, σ
2
m) ≡ πc − πdI =
δ2
(1− 2δ)(1− δ)2 [(µ− c0)
2 + σ2m]−
1
2
σ2local −M. (40)
As shown earlier, the first term in the right-hand side of the above equation rep-
resents the cost of less coordination under decentralization with individual incentives
arising from the fact that the sub-units are looking for a Nash solution rather than
a team-efficient solution under decentralization with individual incentives. The sec-
ond term represents the information cost of centralization arising from the fact that
no local information is used under centralization. Obviously, the third term is the
monitoring cost of centralization.
By subtracting (39) from (37), we obtain the benefit from centralization over
decentralization using group incentives as
Q(σ2local, σ
2
m) ≡ πc − πdG =
1
1− 2δ c
2
0 −
1
2
σ2local −M. (41)
The first term represents the cost of free-riding under decentralization with group
incentives, whereas the second and third terms are the same as above.
Also, by subtracting (39) from (38), we obtain the benefit from decentralization
using individual incentives over that using group incentives as
T (σ2local, σ
2
m) ≡ πdI − πdG =
1
1− 2δ c
2
0 −
δ2
(1− 2δ)(1− δ)2 [(µ− c0)
2 + σ2m]. (42)
Finally, by drawing P (σ2local, σ
2
m) = 0, Q(σ
2
local, σ
2
m) = 0, and T (σ
2
local, σ
2
m) = 0 in
(σ2local, σ
2
m)-space, we obtain Figure 1.
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[Insert Figure 1 here]
From Figure 1, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 4:
(1) If the local uncertainty is big and the market uncertainty is small, then the organi-
zation will be decentralized, and the local managers will be provided with high-powered
individual incentive contracts.
(2) If both the local uncertainty and the market uncertainty are big, then the organiza-
tion will be decentralized, and the local managers will be provided with group incentive
contracts.
(3) If the local uncertainty is small and the market uncertainty is big, and/or if
the monitoring cost is low, then the organization will be centralized, and the local
managers will be provided with forcing contracts.
Note that the information cost of centralization increases as the local uncertainty
increases, that the cost of less coordination under decentralization using individual in-
centives increases as the market uncertainty increases, and that the cost of free-riding
under decentralization using group incentives is independent of both uncertainties.
Therefore, if the organization faces with a big market uncertainty along with a small
local uncertainty, designing a centralized decision-making structure is optimal. How-
ever, if the organization faces with a small market uncertainty along with a big local
uncertainty, then designing a decentralized decision-making structure with providing
individual incentives is optimal. On the other hand, if both the market and local
uncertainties are big, then designing a decentralized decision-making structure with
providing group incentives is optimal.
Brickley and Dark (1987) found that most franchising companies, when decid-
ing whether to franchise or not their units, are more likely to choose to franchise
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a unit as it is harder to monitor that unit (i.e., input monitoring). Also, Krueger
(1991) reported that franchisees typically receive very high-powered incentives, while
employed managers receive little or no explicit incentive pay. If we understand a
company’s choice between company ownership and franchising as a choice between
centralized control and decentralized delegation, these empirical findings are quite
consistent with the result reported in (3) of Proposition 4.
Regarding decentralization using group incentives, we would like to mention a
recent paper by Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997). Ichniowski et. al., by
investigating steel finishing processes in the U.S., concluded that the use of problem-
solving team is more effective in improving worker productivity when it is adopted
together with other work practices such as group incentives and flexible assignment
of workers. In problem-solving teams, the members are usually empowered to make
day-to-day decisions on project assignment and problem-solving (decentralization).
Also, from Figure 1, we can have the following proposition:
Proposition 5: As the external effect among local managers gets bigger (i.e., δ gets
closer to 1/2), the organization will be more likely to adopt centralization, while it
will be more likely to adopt decentralization and to use individual incentives as the
external effect gets smaller (i.e., δ gets closer to 0).
From (40), (41), and (42), note that the cost of decentralization gets bigger as
δ gets bigger, whether it is the cost of less coordination using individual incentives
or the cost of free-riding using group incentives, and that the information cost of
centralization remains constant regardless of the value of δ. Also note that the cost
of less coordination under decentralization with individual incentives approaches zero
as δ goes close to zero, and that both the free-riding cost of decentralization using
group incentives and the information cost of centralization remain substantial.
Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) and Anderson (1985) reported that the firms sell-
ing electronic components are more likely to choose to use independent sales agents as
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their true performances get more difficult to evaluate (i.e., output monitoring) and as
their non-selling activities get more important, whereas they are more likely to choose
to use in-house sales agents (i.e., employees) otherwise. Moreover, independent sales
agents typically receive commission and work under little or no regulation, whereas
the employed sales agents receive salary and work under the firms’ strict regulations
(such as work time, freedom of selling other companies’ products, and buyers they
can sell to). Note that δ in our model can be interpreted as the difficulty of evaluating
each worker’s true performance or the importance of non-selling activities. Therefore,
our result in the above proposition is consistent with the empirical findings in Ander-
son and Schmittlein (1984) and Anderson (1985). It is also consistent with Aghion
and Tirole’s (1997) argument that decision rights tend to be delegated as the interests
of subordinates and bosses get sufficiently correlated since δ can be explained as the
degree of interest conflict between the top manager and the local managers.7
Up to now, we have assumed that δg = δl = δ. Now, we return to our original
assumption that δg ≤ δl. Then, whether the organization adopts a U-form organiza-
tional mode or an M-form organizational mode depends on δl − δg and the relative
sizes of σ21 + σ
2
2 and σ
2
A + σ
2
B. Thus, as shown in Proposition 1, the organization al-
ways adopts a U-form organizational mode under centralization. However, as shown
in Proposition 3, under decentralization, the organization will adopt an M-form or-
ganizational mode if σ2A + σ
2
B is sufficiently big compared with σ
2
1 + σ
2
2 and if δl − δg
is small, and vice versa.
7In a repeated setting in which delegation cannot be committed by a contract and only informal
delegation is feasible through the top manager’s reputation concern, Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy
(1999) showed that informal delegation is infeasible when the subordinate’s interests are too highly
correlated with the boss’s because the fallback is too attractive to the boss in this case. However,
in this paper, we assume that formal delegation can be committed by a contract.
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7 Applications
Here, we will consider two simple applications. These applications are not new. Nei-
ther, are they developed in full. Rather, they are taken to illustrate the implications
of the model we have developed in this paper.
7.1 Environments and Organizations
As we already mentioned in the introduction, many contingency theorists observe sev-
eral patterns regarding the relationship between organization’s external environments
and its internal structures.
One of the most common findings is that organizations in stable environments,
compared with organizations under unstable environments, have more formalized
structures (i.e., their decision-making practices are more centralized). For example,
Lawrence and Lorsch (1968) reported that, in major plastic manufacturing firms
in the U.S., the production department faced the least amount of uncertainty and
was the most formally organized, the research department faced the largest amount
of uncertainty and was least formally organized, and the sales department was in-
between in terms of both external uncertainty and internal structures. The workers
in the production department were usually organized as mutually supportive, whereas
the sales agents were usually organized as rather autonomous.
The sales department’s less predictable environments compared with that of the
production department are mainly due to its large randomness at the local levels.
We would like to quote from Lawrence and Lorsch’s (1968) survey to emphasize the
difference in the amount of uncertainty across sales and production departments.
On sales department: “The market we sell to is broad and diverse. For example,
in the toy business if the product (plastic materials) comes out in the right color
at the right price, anybody will buy it, and anybody can make it. In contrast, for
wire and cable customers, the right technology, service, and delivery are critical, and
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price is at the end of the line.” On production department: “In production, life is
really plain, as it is geared to running the kind of plant and equipment which they
currently have and where most of the decisions are built in.” Thus, as predicted
from Proposition 4, the sales department relies more on decentralized delegation (less
formality) and designs the workers rather autonomous, because its local uncertainty
is big and typically specific to the business area in which each sales worker specializes,
while the production department relies more on centralized control (more formality)
and designs the workers complementary because its local uncertainty is small.
Another stylized phenomenon is that organizations, faced with emergency, tend
to centralize their decisions. For example, centralized rationing is favored in warfare
rather than the market system.8 Also, Stiglitz (1989) said that the political decision-
making process had to be centralized during war time. In warfare, what drastically
increases is generally the randomness of the common shock for the whole economy.
Thus, as predicted from Proposition 4, the economy as an organization must have a
more centralized structure in the war time.
As stated in Proposition 4, the relative sizes of external uncertainties are important
in determining the organization’s internal structures.
7.2 The Dynamics of Organization
Blau and Meyer (1987), like many other sociologists, observe that as a bureaucracy
grows, (i) the proportionate size of its administrative component gets smaller (flat-
tening of bureaucracy), and (ii) authority over decisions is more likely delegated from
the top management to lower levels (decentralization of bureaucracy). Although these
findings seem to contradict the stereotypical view that a large bureaucracy is highly
centralized and inflexible, they are well documented in the literature.9 As proposed
by Blau and Meyer, economies of scale in administration may explain the flattening
8See Milward (1977).
9See, for example, Williamson (1986).
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trend in a bureaucracy. However, the decentralization trend is hard to explain by the
same argument.
Similarly, Chandler (1962) found that a growing firm eventually switched from a
U-form organizational mode to an M-form organizational mode.
When an organization is newly established, it generally faces a great deal of uncer-
tainty mainly because it is newly introduced to the environment. As the organization
develops over time, it accommodates itself to the environment, by internalizing the
uncertainty into its structure, by making operation rules more routine and formal, and
by defining duties and powers more precisely. Since common features of an organi-
zation are easier to internalize than idiosyncratic features and since the uncertainties
associated with the production processes are easier to internalize than those asso-
ciated with the products themselves, mature organizations seem to reduce more of
common uncertainties than local uncertainties and more of line-specific uncertainties
than good-specific uncertainties. As the relative magnitude of common uncertainty
gets smaller, the organization will adopt a decentralized decision-making structure,
and as the relative magnitude of line-specific uncertainty gets smaller, the organi-
zation will more likely take an M-form. Considering that less need for coordination
under decentralization would demand a smaller size of the administrative component,
our model also explains why bureaucracy shows the flattening trend as well as the
decentralization trend. Along this line of argument, Williamson (1986, p.118) writes:
“To the extent that uncertainty decreases as an industry matures (which is the usual
case) the benefits that accrue to integration presumably decline. Accordingly, greater
reliance on obligational market contracting is commonly feasible for transactions of
recurrent trading in mature industries.”
Such organizational dynamics may explain, to some extent, the changing pattern
of Korea’s development strategy as well.10 The Korean government, at an early stage
of economic development in the 1960s, used so-called ‘mandatory planning’, relying
10For details of Korea’s development strategy, see Amsden (1989).
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heavily on the government’s coercive instructions rather than the market mechanism.
However, around the 1980s, it began to switch to ‘indicative planning’, introducing
rough guidelines with less coercion and delegating more economic decisions to the
private sectors. Such a decentralization trend still continues even nowadays.
In the 1960s, Korea’s economic infrastructure was poorly developed. The account-
ing, banking, and legal systems were yet to be developed. The capital market was not
functioning effectively. Such lack of sound economic infrastructures contributed to
magnifying common turbulence for the economy as a whole. Furthermore, the short-
age of employment opportunities in the private sector made government jobs most
attractive. Thus, the government was able to absorb the elite into its bureaucracy,
resulting in the government’s dominance over the private sectors in terms of infor-
mation processing capacity. Consequently, at an early stage of development, a big
macro uncertainty together with the government’s dominance in informational ability
made direct government interventions through mandatory planning more attractive
than laissez-faire.
However, as the economy successfully grew, the lack of infrastructures was sub-
stantially ameliorated. In the meantime, the Korean society became more differen-
tiated and sophisticated. This evolution has reduced the common uncertainty, while
it has increased the local uncertainty. Also, rapid accumulation of know-how (in-
cluding network) in the private sectors considerably undermined, and even reversed
the government’s dominance in information processing. These, in all, made economic
decentralization and indicative planning more attractive at a later development stage
in Korea around the 1980s, as predicted from Proposition 4.
The Korean economy should have moved further toward an autonomous structure
from an initial central control mode. As the private sector becomes more diversified,
the Korean government lacks in adequate knowledge needed to coordinate such a
sophisticated economy well. This explains why, at a later stage of development,
the Korean economy should have moved further toward the market system with less
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governmental interventions and less bureaucracy. However, the Korean economy has
not been successful in restructuring its economy more toward the market system
mainly due to strong resistance from various interest parties who were against such
a move. This began to create inefficiency for the Korean economy as early as mid
1980s and resulted in serious economic crisis in the late 1990s.
The organizational theory developed in this paper also has useful implications
for explaining Chinese ‘success’ vs. Soviet ‘failure’ in their transition from planned
economies to market economies. When the transformation is under process at a
massive level, it is mainly the randomness of common uncertainty which drastically
increases. According to Proposition 4, the increase in common uncertainty calls for
centralization, which is exactly opposite to the liberalization trend and leads to a
dilemma.
Between the two countries, the shock arising from transition was much bigger for
the former Soviet Union than for China. The former Soviet Union had a functionally
divided economy. Each local republic was able to manage its economy only under
the former Soviet block’s coordination, whereas the Chinese provinces were rather
autonomous even before the transition.11 In the case of the former Soviet block, the
additional common uncertainty results from unstable political situations, lack of con-
fidence in money, high and uncertain inflation rates, and lack of central coordination.
Accordingly, the dilemma was much larger for the former Soviet Union.
It is frequently argued that the establishment of well-functioning legal, banking,
and accounting systems is a prerequisite for a successful, full-scale transformation.12
This argument is consistent with our organizational theory since such establishment
will reduce the common uncertainty, nullifying the demand for more centralization,
and thus removing major obstacles to the liberalization movement. However, full
11See Qian and Xu (1993) for differences in initial conditions and reform policies between China
and Eastern European countries.
12See, among others, Litwack (1991), McKinnon (1991, 1994), and Calvo and Frenkel (1991).
34
establishment of such systems will not be realized in a short period of time. In
the meantime, these economies will be better operated by a centralized authority
(decentralization through centralization) as is the case in China or in the earlier
stage of the Korean development process. However, as Korea has already experienced,
China’s smooth and government driven transition will inevitably create many interest
groups who will be against the move toward decentralization and competition in later
stages. Thus, China’s ‘success’ today can potentially cause a big problem in the
future.
8 Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the issue of designing an optimal organizational form in terms of
task allocation among sub-units, decision-making structure, and incentive schemes for
organizational members. We view an organization as a collection of decision-makers
at various hierarchical levels. Being bounded rational, the decision-makers have lim-
ited capacity to identify unstable environments that an organization faces. Efficient
information flows and incentive alignments among the organizational members must
be taken into account in designing an optimal organizational form.
By distinguishing the uncertainty an organization faces into two types, common
uncertainty and local uncertainty, we clarify the relationship between the organiza-
tion’s internal structures and its external environments. Depending on the organi-
zation’s design for task allocation, the internal impacts of the common and local
uncertainties are differentially realized. The common uncertainty has a bigger inter-
nal impact on complementarily designed organizations, while the local uncertainty
has a magnified impact on autonomously designed organizations. Also, the interac-
tion between the sub-units gets stronger when tasks are functionally allocated along
the production processes than when they are allocated along the final products.
Centralization serves for better coordination and decentralization serves for bet-
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ter information. The coordinational benefit under centralization increases as the
randomness of the common uncertainty gets bigger, and this benefit is magnified
when the organization designs its sub-units complementary. The informational ben-
efit increases as the randomness of the local uncertainty gets bigger, and this benefit
is magnified when the organization designs its sub-units rather autonomous. Thus,
we derive a relationship between the organization’s designs for task allocation and
decision-making structure. That is, complementary organizations tend to adopt cen-
tralized decision-making and autonomous organizations tend to adopt decentralized
decision-making.
The organization in our model is assumed to make only one kind of decision. In
reality, however, most organizations make many different kinds of decisions, ranging
from strategic decisions such as long term investments to operating decisions like
daily productions. Different decisions involve different kinds of uncertainties. For
most strategic decisions, the common uncertainty outweighs the localized uncertainty,
whereas the opposite is the case for most operating decisions. Our model explains
why most strategic decisions are made by the top management with the help of
specialized staff members and why most operating decisions are made by the operating
units rather autonomously. Our model also explains why, during war time, most
strategic decisions are handled by a commanding center, while most tactic decisions
are delegated to combat units.
Our model set-up is partly motivated by many differences between U-form orga-
nizations and M-form organizations. In a U-form organization, there exists a strong
interrelation among different divisions. The nature of this interaction is often com-
plementary. In U-form organizations, the common uncertainty is more important.
On the other hand, in an M-form organization, different divisions are operating in ge-
ographically separated areas or are targeting differentiated markets. Each division’s
operation is rather autonomous. The common uncertainty is less important and the
interaction among the divisions is weak.
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We close this section by pointing out two limitations of this paper. First, this
paper does not address other closely related organizational issues such as why most
organizations are hierarchically designed, and what determines the span of control.13
Second, in this paper, we only consider top-down information flow among the organi-
zational members. In reality, however, there are bottom-up information flows as well.
We believe that incorporating the bottom-up information flows into the model will
be useful.
APPENDIX
Derivation of Equation (21):
From the first-order conditions of the optimization problem (20) in the text, we
derive
ad1(k1, k2) = µ− c0k1 + θm + θ1 + δlEY [ad2(k2, k1)|θm, θ1],
ad2(k2, k1) = µ− c0k2 + θm + θ2 + δlEY [ad1(k1, k2)|θm, θ2].
(43)
From (43), by plugging the second equation into the first and by using the fact that
a repeated conditional expectation is equivalent to a single expectation conditional
upon the least common information, we obtain
ad1(k1, k2) = µ−
c0
k1
+ θm + θ1 + δl(µ− c0
k2
+ θm) + δ
2
l EYE[a
d
1(k1, k2)|θm]. (44)
By taking a conditional expectation given θm on both sides of (44), we obtain
EY [a
d
1(k1, k2)|θm] =
1
1− δl (µ+ θm)−
1
1− δ2l
(
c0
k1
+ δl
c0
k2
). (45)
Thus, by plugging (45) into (44), we derive
ad1(k1, k2) =
1
1− δl (µ+ θm) + θ1 −
1
1− δ2l
(
c0
k1
+ δl
c0
k2
).
13Williamson (1967), Calvo and Wellisz (1978), and Qian (1994) consider these issues from an
incentive perspective. Marschak and Radner (1972), Radner (1992,1993), and Geanakoplos and
Milgrom (1991) consider the same issues from an information perspective.
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And, likewise, we derive
ad2(k2, k1) =
1
1− δl (µ+ θm) + θ2 −
1
1− δ2l
(
c0
k2
+ δl
c0
k1
).
Derivation of Equation (23): We can rewrite (21) as
ad1(k1, k2) =
1
1−δl (µ− c0 + θm) + θ1 − c01−δ2l (
1−k1
k1
+ δl
1−k2
k2
),
ad2(k2, k1) =
1
1−δl (µ− c0 + θm) + θ2 − c01−δ2l (
1−k2
k2
+ δl
1−k1
k1
).
(46)
Also, using (22), we have
vd1(k1, k2) =
1
2(1−δl)(µ− c0 + θm) + θ12 + δlθ2 + θA + θB + c02(1−δ2l ) [(1− 2δ
2
l )(
1−k1
k1
)− δl(1−k2k2 )],
vd2(k2, k1) =
1
2(1−δl)(µ− c0 + θm) + θ22 + δlθ1 + θA + θB + c02(1−δ2l ) [(1− 2δ
2
l )(
1−k2
k2
)− δl(1−k1k1 )].
(47)
Therefore, by using (46) and (47), we derive
πdlI(k1, k2) = Eθm{ER[(vd1 − c0)ad1 + (vd2 − c0)ad2|θm]}
= 1
(1−δl)2 [(µ− c0)2 + σ2m] + 12(σ21 + σ22)−
(µ−c0)c0
(1−δl)2 (
1−k1
k1
+ 1−k2
k2
)
− (1−3δ2l )c20
2(1−δ2
l
)2
[(1−k1
k1
)2 + (1−k2
k2
)2]
2δ3
l
c20
(1−δ2
l
)2
(1−k1
k1
)(1−k2
k2
).
Proof of Lemma 1:
From (23), given k2, we obtain
∂πdlI(k1, k2)
∂k1
=
c0
k21(1− δl)2
[µ− c0 − 2δ
3
l c0
(1 + δl)2
1− k2
k2
] +
1− k1
k31
(1− 3δ2l )c20
(1− δ2l )2
.
Since, from (46), we see that (k1, k2) must satisfy that
µ− c0 ≥ c0
1 + δl
(
1− k1
k1
+ δl
1− k2
k2
) ≥ δlc0
1 + δl
1− k2
k2
.
Otherwise, we have that ER[ad1(k1, k2)] < 0, which is obviously not optimal. Since
0 ≤ δl ≤ 12 , we have
µ− c0 ≥ δlc0
1 + δl
1− k2
k2
≥ 2δ
3
l c0
(1 + δl)2
1− k2
k2
,
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and
1− 3δ2l
(1− δ2l )2
> 0.
Therefore, we finally derive
∂πdlI(k1, k2)
∂k1
> 0, ∀k1 ∈ [0, 1] for any given k2 ∈ [0, 1].
As a result, we have kd1 = 1, and by the same method, we have k
d
2 = 1.
Proof of Lemma 2: By taking a first derivative of πdlG(h1, h2) in (30) with respect
to h1 given h2, we have
∂πdlG(h1, h2)
∂h1
=
1
h31h2
[2h2 + 4δlh1 − (2 + 4δl)h1h2].
Since 0 ≤ h1, h2 ≤ 1, we obtain
∂πdlG(h1, h2)
∂h1
> 0, ∀h1 ∈ [0, 1− h2] for any given h2 ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, since h1 + h2 ≤ 1, we have h1 + h2 = 1. By plugging h2 = 1− h1 into (30), we
derive
πdlG(h1) =
1
1−2δl (µ
2 + σ2m) +
1
2
(σ21 + σ
2
2)− 11−2δlµc0
+
c20
2(1−4δ2
l
)
[ 2
h1(1−h1) − 1h21 −
1
(1−h1)2 ],
which will be maximized at h1 =
1
2
. Thus, we derive that the optimal incentive power
for the group incentive contracts is hd1 = h
d
2 =
1
2
.
Proof of Lemma 3:
Let φ(δ) ≡ δ2
(1−δ)2 . Then, we have φ(δ) is increasing in 0 ≤ δ ≤ 12 with φ(0) = 0
and φ(1
2
) = 1. Since µ > 2c0, we have
c20
(µ− c0)2 + σ2m
< 1.
Therefore, there always exists δˆ ∈ (0, 1
2
) satisfying
φ(δˆl) =
c20
(µ− c0)2 + σ2m
.
Since φ(δ) is increasing in δ, from (35) and (36), we can easily prove that πdlG ≥ (<)πdlI
if δl ≥ (<)δˆ, and πdgG ≥ (<)πdgI if δg ≥ (<)δˆ.
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